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Quantum secure communication protocols based on entanglement swapping
Jian Wang,∗ Quan Zhang, and Chao-jing Tang
School of Electronic Science and Engineering,
National University of Defense Technology,
Changsha, 410073, China
We present a quantum secure direct communication protocol and a multiparty quantum secret
sharing protocol based on Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs and entanglement swapping. The present
quantum secure direct communication protocol makes use of the ideal of block transmission. We
also point out that the sender can encode his or her secret message without ensuring the security of
the quantum channel firstly. In the multiparty quantum secret sharing protocol, the communication
parties adopt checking mode or encoding mode with a certain probability. It is not necessary for
the protocol to perform local unitary operation. In both the protocols, one party transmits only one
photon for each Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pair to another party and the security for the transmitting
photons is ensured by selecting Z-basis or X-basis randomly to measure the sampling photons.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk
Quantum cryptography has been one of the most
promising applications of quantum information science.
It utilizes quantum effects to provide unconditionally se-
cure information exchange. Quantum key distribution
(QKD) which provides unconditionally secure key ex-
change has progressed quickly [1, 2, 3, 4]. In recent years,
a good many of other quantum cryptography schemes
have also been proposed and pursued, such as quantum
secret sharing (QSS)[5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13], quan-
tum secure direct communication (QSDC) [14, 15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. QSS is the generaliza-
tion of classical secret sharing to quantum scenario and
can share both classical and quantum messages among
sharers. Many works have been carried out in both theo-
retical and experimental aspects after the pioneering QSS
scheme proposed by M. Hillery et al. in 1999 (hereafter
called HBB99)[5]. We can classify the QSS schemes as
schemes using entanglement or schemes without entan-
glement. The HBB99 scheme is based on a three-particle
entangled Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state. A.
Karlsson et al. proposed a QSS scheme using two-particle
Bell states [6]. Based on multi-particles entangled states
and teleportation, we presented a multiparty QSS scheme
of QSDC [8]. G. P. Guo and G. C. Guo presented a QSS
scheme where only product states are employed [9]. Z.
J. Zhang et al. [10] proposed a QSS scheme using single
photons. QSDC’s object is to transmit the secret mes-
sage directly without first establishing a key to encrypt
them, which is different to QKD. QSDC can be used in
some special environments which has been shown by K.
Bostro¨em et al. and F. G. Deng et al.[15, 16]. Many
researches have been carried out in QSDC. These works
can also be divided into two types, one utilizes single
photons [17, 18, 19], the other utilizes entangled state
[15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. F. G. Deng et al.
proposed a QSDC scheme using batches of single pho-
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tons which serves as one-time pad [17]. Q. Y. Cai et
al. presented a deterministic secure direct communica-
tion scheme using single qubit in a mixed state [18]. We
proposed a QSDC scheme based on order rearrangement
of single photons [19]. The QSDC scheme using entan-
glement state is certainly the mainstream. K. Bostro¨em
and T. Felbinger proposed a ”Ping-Pong” QSDC proto-
col which is quasi-secure for secure direct communication
if perfect quantum channel is used [15]. Q. Y. Cai et al.
pointed out that the ”Ping-Pong” Protocol is vulnerable
to denial of service attack or joint horse attack with in-
visible photon [27, 28]. They also presented an improved
protocol which doubled the capacity of the ”Ping-Pong”
protocol [20]. F. G. Deng and G. L. Long put forward a
two-step QSDC protocol using Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
(EPR) pairs [16]. We presented a QSDC scheme using
EPR pairs and teleportation [21] and a multiparty con-
trolled QSDC scheme using GHZ states [22].
Entanglement swapping can entangle two quantum
systems that do not have direct interaction with each
other. It plays an important role in quantum infor-
mation. There are also many quantum cryptography
schemes using entanglement swapping. Z. J. Zhang et
al. presented a multiparty QSS scheme [12] and a QSDC
scheme based on entanglement swapping and local uni-
tary operations [29]. Y. M. Li put forward a multiparty
QSS of quantum information by swapping quantum en-
tanglement [13]. Based on entanglement swapping, T.
Gao et al. proposed two QSDC schemes using GHZ states
and Bell states, respectively [30, 31]. We first describe
entanglement swapping simply. The four Bell states are
|φ±〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉),
|ψ±〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉). (1)
Suppose two distant parties, Alice and Bob, share |φ+12〉
and |φ+34〉 where Alice has qubits 1 and 4, and Bob pos-
2sesses 2 and 3. Note that
|φ+12〉 ⊗ |φ+34〉 =
1
2
(|φ+14〉|φ+23〉+ |φ−14〉|φ−23〉
+|ψ+14〉|ψ+23〉+ |ψ−14〉|ψ−23〉. (2)
After Bell basis measurement on qubits 1 and 4, the state
of the qubits 1, 2, 3, 4 collapses to |φ+14〉|φ+23〉, |φ−14〉|φ−23〉,
|ψ+14〉|ψ+23〉 and |ψ−14〉|ψ−23〉 each with probability 1/4. If
Alice and Bob share other Bell states, similar results can
be achieved. We give the relations used in our paper, as
|φ−12〉 ⊗ |φ+34〉 =
1
2
(|φ+14〉|φ−23〉+ |φ−14〉|φ+23〉
+|ψ−14〉|ψ+23〉+ |ψ+14〉|ψ−23〉,
|ψ+12〉 ⊗ |φ+34〉 =
1
2
(|φ+14〉|ψ+23〉 − |φ−14〉|ψ−23〉
+|ψ+14〉|φ+23〉 − |ψ−14〉|φ−23〉,
|ψ−12〉 ⊗ |φ+34〉 =
1
2
(|φ−14〉|ψ+23〉 − |φ+14〉|ψ−23〉
+|ψ−14〉|φ+23〉 − |ψ+14〉|φ−23〉, (3)
We then present a QSDC protocol using EPR pairs and
entanglement swapping. Suppose the sender Alice wants
to transmit her secret message directly to the receiver
Bob.
(1) Alice prepares an ordered N EPR pairs. Each of
the EPR pairs is in the state |φ+12〉. We denotes the or-
dered N EPR pairs with {[P1(1),P1(2)], [P2(1),P2(2)],
· · · , [PN (1),PN (2)]}, where the subscript indicates the
order of each EPR pair in the sequence, and 1, 2 repre-
sents the two-photon of each pair. Alice takes one pho-
ton from each state to form an ordered partner photon
sequence [P1(1), P2(1),· · · , PN (1)], called S1 sequence.
The remaining partner photons compose S2 sequence,
[P1(2), P2(2),· · · , PN(2)]. Bob also prepares N EPR
pairs each of which is in the state |φ+34〉. In the same way,
Bob divides the N EPR pairs into S3 sequence, [P1(3),
P2(3),· · · , PN (4)] and S4 sequence, [P1(4), P2(4),· · · ,
PN(4)]. Alice then sends the S2 sequence to Bob. Bob
sends the S4 sequence to Alice at the same time.
(2) After confirming the two parties have received
the photon sequence, Alice selects randomly a suffi-
ciently large subset from the photon sequence for eaves-
dropping check. She chooses randomly one of the
two measuring basis Z-basis (|0〉, |1〉) and X-basis
(|+〉= 1√
2
(|0〉+|1〉),|−〉= 1√
2
(|0〉-|1〉)) to measure the pho-
ton 1. She then tells Bob the positions of the sampling
photons, the measuring basis she has chosen and her mea-
surement result. Bob measures the photon 2 in the same
measuring basis as Alice and compares his result with
Alice’s. He thus can evaluate the error rate of the trans-
mission of the S2 sequence. To ensure the security of the
transmission of the S4 sequence, Alice and Bob utilize the
same method to check eavesdropping. If the error rate
exceeds the threshold, they abort the protocol. Other-
wise, they continue to the next step.
(3) After ensuring the security of the EPR pairs, Alice
encodes her secret message on the photon 1. She per-
forms one of the four unitary operations
I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|,
σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|,
iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|,
σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|. (4)
on the photon 1, according to her secret message. The
operations I, σx, iσy and σz denote secret message “00”,
“01”, “10” and “11”, respectively. Alice then performs
Bell basis measurement on the photons 1 and 4 and pub-
lishes her measurement results.
(4) Bob measures the photons 2 and 3 in the Bell basis.
Because of the operation I (σx, iσy, σz ) performed on
the photon 1, the state |φ+12〉 is changed to |φ+12〉 (|ψ+12〉,
|ψ−12〉, |φ−12〉). Note that the equations 2 and 3. Bob can
then deduce Alice’s secret according to his result and
Alice’s result, as illustrated in Tabel 1. For example, if
Alice’s result is |ψ−14〉 and Bob’s result is |φ−23〉, Alice’s
secret must be “01”. That is to say Alice performed σx
operation on the photon 1.
TABLE I: The recovery of Alice’s secret message
Alice’s secret {Alice’s result, Bob’s result}
00 (I) {|φ+14〉, |φ
+
23〉} {|φ
−
14〉, |φ
−
23〉}
{|ψ+14〉, |ψ
+
23〉} {|ψ
−
14〉, |ψ
−
23〉}
01 (σx) {|φ
+
14〉, |ψ
+
23〉} {|φ
−
14〉, |ψ
−
23〉}
{|ψ+14〉, |φ
+
23〉} {|ψ
−
14〉, |φ
−
23〉}
10 (iσy) {|φ
−
14〉, |ψ
+
23〉} {|φ
+
14〉, |ψ
−
23〉}
{|ψ−14〉, |φ
+
23〉} {|ψ
+
14〉, |φ
−
23〉}
11 (σz) {|φ
+
14〉, |φ
−
23〉} {|φ
−
14〉, |φ
+
23〉}
{|ψ−14〉, |ψ
+
23〉} {|ψ
+
14〉, |ψ
−
23〉}
The security for the present protocol is the same as
that for BBM92 protocol. To ensure the security of the
transmission of the S2 and S4 sequence, the communica-
tion parties perform Z-basis orX-Basis measurements on
the sampling photons, which is similar to that of BBM92
protocol. Only after confirming the security of the quan-
tum channel could Alice encode her secret message on the
photon 1 and announce her measurement result. Thus
our protocol is unconditional secure.
Actually, in the present QSDC scheme, Alice can en-
code her secret message directly on the EPR pairs with-
out ensuring the security of the quantum channel firstly.
Alice prepares a batch of EPR pairs each of which is in
one of the four Bell states according to her secret mes-
sage. The states |φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉 and |ψ−〉 represent the
secret message “00”, “01”, “10” and “11”, respectively.
Alice inserts randomly some sampling EPR pairs in the
encoding sequence for eavesdropping check. Similar to
the step 2 in the present protocol, Alice and Bob chooses
randomly Z-basis or X-basis to measure the sampling
photons. Only after confirming the security of the quan-
tum channel could Alice publish her results of Bell basis
3measurement. After obtaining Alice’s results, Bob can
then recover her secret message.
We then present a multiparty QSS protocol using EPR
pairs and entanglement swapping. We first present a
three-party QSS protocol and then generalize it to a mul-
tiparty QSS one. Suppose Alice want to share a random
key with Bob and Charlie.
(1) Alice, Bob and Charlie agree that the four Bell
states |φ+〉, |φ−〉, |ψ+〉 and |ψ−〉 represent the two-bit
information “00”, “01”, “10” and “11”, respectively.
(2) Alice (Bob, Charlie) prepares an EPR pair in the
state |φ+12〉 (|φ+34〉, |φ+56〉). Alice (Bob, Charlie) send the
photon 2 (4, 6) to Bob (Charlie, Alice).
(3) Alice chooses one of the two modes, checking mode
with probability p and encoding mode with probability
1− p. If Alice selects checking mode, the procedure goes
to (C4), otherwise they perform the step (E4).
(C4) Bob performs Z-basis or X-basis measurement
randomly on the photon 2 and informs Alice the measur-
ing basis he has chosen and his measurement result. Alice
then measures the photon 1 in the same measuring basis
as Bob and compares her result with Bob’s. The method
of eavesdropping check is similar to that of BBM92 pro-
tocol, which ensures the security of the transmission of
the photon 2. If there is no eavesdropper, their results
should be accordant. The same method is used to check
the security of the transmission of the photon 6. To pre-
vent a dishonest party’s attack and ensure the security of
the transmission of the photon 4, Alice selects randomly
Bob or Charlie to choose a random measuring basis (Z-
basis orX-basis) to measure the photon and then publish
his or her corresponding measurement result. If there is
no eavesdropping, they return to the step 1. Otherwise,
the protocol is aborted.
(E4) Alice (Bob, Charlie) performs Bell basis measure-
ment on the photons 1 and 6 (2 and 3, 4 and 5).According
to Eq. 2 and 3, we can obtain
|φ+12〉 ⊗ |φ+34〉 ⊗ |φ+56〉 =
1
4
(|φ+16〉|φ+23〉|φ+45〉+ |φ+16〉|φ−23〉|φ−45〉
+|φ+16〉|ψ+23〉|ψ+45〉+ |φ+16〉|ψ−23〉|ψ−45〉
+|φ−16〉|φ+23〉|φ−45〉+ |φ−16〉|φ−23〉|φ+45〉
+|φ−16〉|ψ−23〉|ψ+45〉+ |φ−16〉|ψ+23〉|ψ−45〉
+|ψ+16〉|φ+23〉|ψ+45〉 − |ψ+16〉|φ−23〉|ψ−45〉
+|ψ+16〉|ψ+23〉|φ+45〉 − |ψ+16〉|ψ−23〉|φ−45〉
+|ψ−16〉|φ−23〉|ψ+45〉 − |ψ−16〉|φ+23〉|ψ−45〉
+|ψ−16〉|ψ−23〉|φ+45〉 − |ψ−16〉|ψ+23〉|φ−45〉).
(5)
After the three-party’s Bell basis measurements, the state
of the photons 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 collapses to one of the
sixteen states in the Eq. 5 with probability 1/16. Alice
can then share a random key with Bob and Charlie, as
illustrate in Table 2.Suppose Bob’s result is |φ+23〉 and
Charlie’s result is |φ−45〉. If Bob collaborates with Charlie,
they can deduce that Alice’s result is |φ−16〉 according to
Eq. 5. Thus Alice shares two-bit secret “01” with Bob
and Charlie.
TABLE II: The establishment of sharing secret key
Alice’s result {Bob’s result, Charlie’s result} the sharing key
|φ+16〉 {|φ
+
23〉, |φ
+
45〉} {|φ
−
23〉, |φ
−
45〉} 00
{|ψ+23〉, |ψ
+
45〉} {|ψ
−
23〉, |ψ
−
45〉}
|φ−16〉 {|φ
+
23〉, |φ
−
45〉} {|φ
−
23〉, |φ
+
45〉} 01
{|ψ−23〉, |ψ
+
45〉} {|ψ
+
23〉, |ψ
−
45〉}
|ψ+16〉 {|φ
+
23〉, |ψ
+
45〉} {|φ
−
23〉, |ψ
−
45〉} 10
{|ψ+23〉, |φ
+
45〉} {|ψ
−
23〉, |φ
−
45〉}
|ψ−16〉 {|φ
−
23〉, |ψ
+
45〉} {|φ
+
23〉, |ψ
−
45〉} 11
{|ψ−23〉, |φ
+
45〉} {|ψ
+
23〉, |φ
−
45〉}
We then analyze the security of the three-party QSS
protocol. Each of the communication parties transmits
only one photon for each EPR pair. The communica-
tion parties selects randomly one of the two measur-
ing basis (Z-basis and X-basis) to check eavesdropping.
This method for eavesdropping check is similar to that of
BBM92 protocol, which is proved to be unconditionally
secure. As long as the security of the transmission of the
photons 2, 4, 6 is ensured, the present protocol is secure.
The attack of Eve or a dishonest parties will be detected
in the checking mode.
The three-party QSS protocol can be easily general-
ized to a multiparty one. Suppose Alice want to share
a random secret key with Bob, Charlie, Dick, · · · , York
and Zach. Each of the communication parties prepares
an EPR pair in the state |φ+〉 and sends one photon of
the EPR pair to the next party. That is to say Alice
send one photon to Bob, Bob send one photon to Char-
lie, · · · , York sends one photon to Zach and Zach send one
to Alice. Similar to the three-party QSS protocol, Alice
chooses checking mode and encoding mode with proba-
bility p and 1 − p, respectively. In the checking mode,
the communication parties utilizes random Z-basis and
X-basis measurement to ensure the security of the trans-
mitting photons. In the encoding mode, each of the com-
munication parties performs Bell basis measurement on
their two photons. Thus if only Bob, Charlie, · · · , York
and Zach collaborate, they can share a random key with
Alice. The details of the multiparty QSS protocol is very
similar to that of the three-party one. And the security
for the multiparty QSS protocol is the same as that for
three-party one.
So far we have presented a QSDC protocol and a multi-
party QSS protocol using entanglement swapping. Both
the protocols utilizes EPR pairs to achieve secure infor-
mation exchange. The communication parties transmit
only one photon for each EPR pair in the two protocols
and utilize random Z-basis or X-basis measurement to
ensure the security of the transmitting photon. Different
to Ref. [29], both the parties prepares a batch of EPR
pairs in our QSDC protocol. We also point out that the
sender Alice can encode her secret message on the EPR
4pairs without ensuring the security of the quantum chan-
nel firstly. In our multiparty QSS protocol, different to
Ref. [12], the parties share a random secret key without
performing local unitary operations, which simplifies the
protocol.
Acknowledgments
This work is supported by the National Natural Sci-
ence Foundation of China under Grant No. 60472032.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE
international Conference on Computers, Systems and
signal Processing, Bangalore, India (IEEE, New York),
pp. 175 - 179 (1984).
[2] C. H. Bennett, Phys. Rev. Lett. 68, 3121 (1992).
[3] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[4] C. H. Bennett, G. Brassard and N. D. Mermin, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 68, 557 (1992).
[5] M. Hillery, V. Buzeˇk, and A. Berthiaume, Phys. Rev. A
59, 1829 (1999).
[6] A. Karlsson, M. Koashi, and N. Imoto, Phys. Rev. A 59,
162 (1999).
[7] Z. J. Zhang, Phys. Lett. A 342, 60 (2005).
[8] J. Wang, Q. Zhang and C. J. Tang, quant-ph/0510212.
[9] G. P. Guo and G. C. Guo, Phys. Lett. A 310, 247 (2003).
[10] Z. J. Zhang, Y. Li and Z. X. Man, Phys. Rev. A 71,
044301 (2005).
[11] Li Xiao, Gui Lu Long, Fu-Guo Deng, and Jian-Wei Pan,
Phys. Rev. A 69, 052307 (2004)
[12] Z. J. Zhang and Z. X. Man, quant-ph/0406103.
[13] Y. M. Li, K. S. Zhang and K. C. Peng, Phys. Lett. A
324, 420 (2004).
[14] A. Beige, B.-G. Englert, Ch. Kurtsiefer, and H. Wein-
furter, Acta Phys. Pol. A 101, 357 (2002).
[15] K. Bostro¨em and T. Felbinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89,
187902 (2002).
[16] F. G. Deng, G. L. Long, and X. S. Liu, Phys. Rev. A 68,
042317 (2003).
[17] F. G. Deng and G. L. Long, Phys. Rev. A 69, 052319
(2004).
[18] Q. Y. Cai and B. W. Li, Chin. Phys. Lett. 21, 601 (2004).
[19] J. Wang, Q. Zhang and C. J. Tang, quant-ph/0603100.
[20] Q. Y. Cai and B. W. Li, Phys. Rew. A 69, 054301 (2004).
[21] J. Wang, Q. Zhang and C. J. Tang, quant-ph/0511092.
[22] J. Wang, Q. Zhang and C. J. Tang, quant-ph/0602166.
[23] C. Wang, F. G. Deng, Y. S. Li, X. S. Liu and G. L. Long,
Phys. Rev. A 71, 044305 (2005).
[24] C. Wang, F. G. Deng and G. L. Long, Opt. Commun.
253, 15 (2005).
[25] T. Gao, F. L. Yan and Z. X. Wang, quant-ph/0406083.
[26] Z. J. Zhang and Z. X. Man, quant-ph/040321.
[27] Q. Y. Cai, Phys. Rew. Lett. 91, 109801 (2003).
[28] Q. Y. Cai, Phys. Lett. A 351, 23 (2006).
[29] Z. J. Zhang and Z. X. Man, quant-ph/0403218.
[30] T. Gao, F. L. Yan and Z. X. Wang, quant-ph/0406082.
[31] T. Gao, F. L. Yan and Z. X. Wang, quant-ph/0406083.
